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Preferential trade agreements lead to a reallocation of resources across sectors 
and space. Production patterns resulting from North-North regional integration 
initiatives have been documented in several studies. However, empirical 
evidence on South-South arrangements is rather limited. In this respect, 
MERCOSUR provides an interesting case study. This paper aims at answering 
one main question: To what extent has the establishment of MERCOSUR 
affected the production patterns across member countries? Using data for the 
period 1985-1998, we identify the determinants of manufacturing production 
patterns and assess their changes in the context of deepened preferential trade 
liberalization. We find that increased regional economic integration has a 
significant impact on these patterns.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Do preferential trade liberalization induce changes in production patterns across countries? 
International trade theory suggests a positive answer: reduced trade costs are likely to result in a 
spatial reorganization of production. In this paper we investigate the effects of the establishment of 
MERCOSUR on production patterns in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay over the period 1985-1998.1  
The number of South-South preferential trade agreements has rapidly increased in recent 
years. Just in Latin America 17 trade treaties were signed between 1991 and 2002 (see IADB, 2002). Not 
surprisingly, there is an ongoing policy debate about the implications of these agreements for 
involved nations (see World Bank, 2000, and Panagariya, 2000). Some authors argue that developing 
countries have small economies with a relatively similar and concentrated structure of production so 
that there is a priori not much hope that regional integration will generate strong gains in terms of 
new opportunities for production and trade (see, e.g., Leamer, 1998).  
Formal analyses of the consequences of South-South trade arrangements confirm some of 
these fears. Thus, Venables (2003) uses the traditional concepts of comparative advantage and trade 
creation–trade diversion to predict that these agreements can foster a process of production and 
income divergence among members giving rise to a clear pattern of losers and winners. In particular, 
the least industrialized participating economy can loose via trade-diversion effects.  
On the other hand, Puga and Venables (1998) use a framework where cumulative processes 
triggered by economies of scales and cost and demand linkages can potentially induce concentration 
of industrial activities in certain countries. Specifically, these authors show that South-South trade 
arrangements can be associated with a very unequal spread of industry among participating 
countries, at least during the transition. 
Both Venables (2003) and Puga and Venables (1998) therefore conclude that preferential trade 
agreements between developing countries can potentially generate diverging patterns of industrial 
                                                 
1 Unfortunately, Paraguay could be included in the analysis due to missing data.    2
development across members. Moreover, developing countries seem to be better served by trade 
arrangements with developed countries than with pairs.  
  To what extent have the above disquieting predictions been confirmed in practice? The 
answer is: we do not know. The empirical evidence on the impact of South-South agreements on 
industrial production patterns is almost absent. This should be contrasted with the numerous studies 
that analyze the cases of North-North and North-South preferential trade arrangements.2  
The purpose of this paper is to fill the aforementioned gap in the empirical literature by 
looking at the effects of the establishment of MERCOSUR on manufacturing production patterns in 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay over the period 1985-1998. MERCOSUR provides an interesting case 
study. This regional integration agreement is undoubtedly one the most important trade initiative 
among developing countries. It has been established in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay. Intra-regional trade was gradually liberalized between 1991 and 1994 for most sectors and a 
Common External Tariff was implemented by 1995 featuring tariff rates which vary between 0% and 
20%. For some items external barriers have been set at very high levels. Potential problems stemming 
from trade diversion can be thus substantial. Furthermore, MERCOSUR is a customs union signed 
among countries with important size differences. Brazil, the largest economy in the bloc, has a GDP 
that is 10 or 15 times that of the smaller countries (Uruguay or Paraguay). This allows us to study 
whether this size asymmetry is or not relevant factor affecting the dynamic of industrial development 
within the area. More precisely, we address the following questions: What were the consequences of 
MERCOSUR on the industrial development of member countries? To what extent did traditional 
endowment and intensity factors matter relative to market size and input-output linkages for the 
location of industry in MERCOSUR? Did the relative importance of these forces change as a result of 
preferential trade liberalization? 
In addressing these questions we further contribute to the empirical literature by explicitly 
assessing the consequences of tariff preferences with the help of a preference margin variable and by 
using improved econometric techniques (i.e., GMM methods) which permit us to circumvent 
endogeneity and serial correlation problems.  
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Brülhart and Torstensson (1996), Amiti (1998), Brülhart (1998a, 1998b, 2001), Haaland et al. (1999), Midelfart et al. 
(2000), and Overman et al. (2000) for the first case, and Hanson (1997, 1998) for the second case.   3
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 reviews theoretical analyses of 
the effect of preferential trade liberalization among developing countries on production patterns. 
Section 3 presents a brief summary of trade policy reforms in MERCOSUR member countries. Section 
4 introduces the dataset and describes basic stylized facts about trade patterns and industry 
development in these countries. Section 5 explains the empirical methodology. Section 6 reports and 
discusses the estimation results showing the impact of MERCOSUR on manufacturing production 
patterns. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2 Theoretical  Framework 
 
How does preferential trade liberalization between developing countries affect industry development 
patterns? This section reviews the predictions from two alternative theoretical approaches. Each of the 
analyses assumes a different view as to why countries trade with each other. Venables (2003) 
emphasizes the traditional comparative advantage mechanism and trade diversion-trade creation 
effects. On the other hand, Venables and Puga (1998) introduce cumulative processes triggered by 
economies of scale and backward and forward linkages. We believe that by covering these two 
approaches we are exhausting most possible explanations (at least those coming from trade theory). 
 
2.1  Preferential Trade Liberalization and Comparative Advantage 
 
Venables (2003) proposes a model along the lines of the traditional trade theory. He shows that the 
impact of preferential arrangements hinges upon the comparative advantage of member countries, 
relative to each other and relative to the rest of the world. In particular, countries with a comparative 
advantage between that of their partners and the rest of the world benefit at the expense of countries 
having an “extreme” comparative advantage. The explanation is as follows. Assume that two 
developing countries, A and B, decide to establish a customs union. There are two sectors: agriculture, 
which is intensive in unskilled labor, and manufacturing, which is intensive in skilled labor. Suppose 
further that both countries are abundant in unskilled labor relative to the rest of the world. Country B, 
is also abundant in such a factor relative to the partner. Evidently, this second country has an   4
“extreme” comparative advantage, while the other one an “intermediate” comparative advantage. As 
a consequence, the formation of a customs union between these two countries will result in country A 
exporting manufacturing to B and this last country will export agriculture goods in return. Generally, 
the launching of a preferential trade agreement among developing countries with different 
comparative disadvantages relative to the rest of the world tends to induce a restructuring of 
manufacturing production in favor of the country that, even with a comparative disadvantage relative 
to the world, has a comparative advantage within the newly created regional economic space so that 
consumers would be increasingly supplied with manufactures stemming from that country. 
  From the discussion above, we can conclude that South-South preferential trade liberalization 
magnifies the relative importance of regional comparative advantage in shaping manufacturing 
production patterns across member countries for those sectors where they have a comparative 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Thus, higher preferential margins will be associated with 
an intensified tendency of sectors to locate in that country that, within the region, is relatively 
abundant in those factors they use intensively in their production processes. 
 
2.2  Preferential Trade Liberalization, Economies of Scale, and Input-Output Linkages 
 
Puga and Venables (1998) explore the implications of different trading arrangements on industrial 
development and intra-regional disparities using a new trade model that incorporates additional 
explanatory factors. This model features cumulative causation through input-output linkages among 
firms that have increasing returns to scale and operate in imperfectly competitive environments.  
These authors highlight that preferential trade arrangements between developing countries 
can lead to industrialization of the region as a whole as a consequence of the effective market 
enlargement induced by reducing intra-South barriers.3 Moreover, as usual in this kind of settings, 
agglomeration forces are strongest for intermediate trade costs. Hence, for intermediate tariffs the 
outcome within the bloc is asymmetric with manufacturing industry tending to concentrate in one the 
member countries. Which country does host the industry? Countries are assumed to be initially 
                                                 
3 Puga and Venables (1998) assume that initially there is no industry in the South countries. This analysis can be easily extended 
to the case where industry is already present there by assuming that transport costs between North and South are large enough.   5
identical so that there is no basis to discriminate among them. In addition, in this case the 
aforementioned diverging pattern between countries may be only transitional, since industry may 
start to disperse as tariffs are reduced low enough. However, the indeterminacy may disappear if size 
asymmetry prevailed. In particular, a large domestic market increases the attraction of a country as a 
base for industrial sectors with increasing returns to scale. The uneven spread is then driven by the 
cost and demand linkages they create to other firms in the same country, i.e., as more firms are settled 
in the same location more intermediate inputs will be locally available and thus at a lower price and 
the intermediate demand will be higher (see also Venables, 1999). Under these circumstances, there is 
no guarantee that the final trade liberalization will go far enough to promote the spread of industry to 
all participating countries, especially when important barriers persist. Thus, whether preferential 
trade arrangements strengthen or weaken agglomeration forces is an empirical question, as this 
depends on the involved countries and the level of remaining trade costs. 
  We can therefore conclude that if there are substantial underlying size differences between 
economies, South-South preferential trade liberalization will be on average associated with decreased 
manufacturing production in the smallest country of the agreement. This is especially the case if at the 
starting point tariffs were enough high that industry spread over countries in proportion to their 
initial size and when significant barriers (both natural and artificial) still segment markets. In 
particular, under these conditions, higher preferential margins can accentuate the tendency of 
manufacturing sectors with economies of scale to locate in countries with larger market potentials and 
that of sectors with strong cost and demand linkages to locate in countries with larger industrial bases. 
On the other hand, if preferential trade agreements are associated with a substantial reduction of 
internal trade obstacles, these agglomeration forces will not become stronger and may be even 
weakened.  
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3  MERCOSUR: Tariff Policy Reforms 
 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay implemented broad trade reforms over the last two decades. A 
distinguishing feature of the reduction and elimination of trade barriers in these economies is that the 
process of preferential trade liberalization overlapped with the latter stages of unilateral programs 
that had been previously initiated in each country. Given the relevance of these reforms for 
understanding the changes in manufacturing production patterns, this sub-section will describe the 
trade liberalization strategy pursued by member countries of MERCOSUR. 
 
3.1  Unilateral Trade Liberalization 
 
Argentina, Brazil, and to less extent Uruguay have traditionally had relatively high tariffs. As shown 
in Table 1, these countries started to unilaterally reduce MFN tariffs by the mid-1980s, i.e., before the 
establishment of MERCOSUR. This process of trade liberalization generalized by the beginning of the 
1990s. In particular, tariff cuts were particularly pronounced in the larger economies between 1988 
and 1991. Note, on the other hand, that while in Argentina trade reform seems to have been completed 
by 1991, in the remaining countries the impulse towards further liberalization continued up to 1994.  
 
3.2  Preferential Trade Liberalization 
 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay had signed a number of bilateral agreements within the LAIA (Latin 
American Integration Association) framework. These agreements were based on positive lists of 
products, i.e., products that obtained tariff preferences (with variable degree of preference margins) 
and also got exempted from non-tariff barriers (see Estervadeordal et al., 2000). Nevertheless, as 
highlighted in Table 1, the level of tariff preference was rather limited by the mid-1980s.  
MERCOSUR was established by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 1991 with the 
Treaty of Asuncion. The first article of this treaty states that the agreement aims at achieving “the free 
circulation of goods, services, and production factors among the member countries, through the 
elimination of the tariff and non tariff restrictions to the circulation of merchandises and of any other   7
equivalent measure”. It also established the adoption of a Common External Tariff (CET) and a 
common trade policy with third countries or groupings of countries. We can split up the evolution of 
MERCOSUR into two sub-periods: the transition period towards the free trade are and the customs 
union period.  
The transition phase extended between 1991 and 1994 and consisted of progressive, linear, 
and automatic tariff reductions at six months intervals. This sequence aimed to achieve free trade 
within the bloc by the end of 1994. The drop in preferential tariffs since 1991 reflects this policy (see 
Table 1). Exemptions to internal free trade were nevertheless allowed for a limited number of 
products on a temporary basis. In particular, Brazil included in its national exemption list only 29 
items, including wool products, peaches in can, rubber factories, and wines. Argentina had 223 tariff 
line items on this list, of which 57% were steel products, 19% textiles, 11% paper, and 6% footwear. 
Finally, Uruguay had an extensive list with 953 items, including textiles (22%), and steel and electric 
machinery (8%) (see INTAL, 1996). In addition to the general exceptions already indicated, the sugar 
and automotive sectors were not included in the general intra-MERCOSUR trade liberalization 
scheme due to significant divergence across member countries in their national policies toward these 
sectors, especially in the cases of Argentina and Brazil. In the interim, the exchange of these products 
took place under a specific set of rules and restrictions. For autos, a managed trade arrangement was 
in place, which favors local contents, importation of parts under special conditions, and export 
balancing requirements. 
  The customs union period begun with the establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET), 
which entered into force at the beginning of 1995. The average level of the CET was approximately 
11%, but tariff levels were allowed to vary between 0 and 20% across industries.  In general, the lowest 
tariffs were set on input and materials, intermediate tariffs were charged on semi-finished industrial 
goods, and the highest tariffs were assigned to final manufactures. 
During this period two type of exceptions must be handled with. First, remaining products in 
national lists that were exempted from internal free trade were included in the so-called  "Adaptation 
Regime". Within this regime tariffs were progressively and automatically reduced so that import taxes 
would be completely eliminated by January 1, 1999 in the case of Argentina and Brazil, and by 
January 1, 2000 for Uruguay.    8
  Second, just as with intra-MERCOSUR tariffs, exceptions were granted for extra-zone trade so 
that certain imports faced tariff rates different from the CET. Countries agreed that the import taxes 
on these products would progressively converge toward the CET by the year 2001. Out of 
approximately 9000 8-digit tariff lines, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay initially selected 300 each. In 
addition, exceptions to the CET were established for capital goods imports (e.g., machines and 
equipment), computers, and telecommunication equipment.4  
  An overall assessment of the result of the preferential trade reforms in the framework of 
MERCOSUR up to 1996 can be performed with the help of Table 2, taken from Olarreaga and Soloaga 
(1998). This table contains data on average 8-digit HS tariffs, extra-bloc and intra-bloc, for Argentina, 
Brazil, and Uruguay. We can conclude that, in spite of the above mentioned exceptions, countries 
were on average very close to internal free trade. Average external tariffs, even though substantially 
lower than in the past, are still high relative to those of developed countries. 
 
4  MERCOSUR: Trade and Production Patterns 
 
The trade policy reforms described above can potentially be associated with significant changes in 
trade and production patterns. After introducing our dataset, this section presents descriptive 




We describe production patterns in MERCOSUR using production value data for each manufacturing 
industry at ISIC, Rev. 2, 3 digit-level. These data is part of the PADI database produced by the Industry 
and Technological Development Unit at the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America 
and Caribbean (ECLAC). It includes homogeneous statistical information for the period from 1985 to 
1998 on an annual basis.  
                                                 
4 Though a CET was also established for Textiles, countries agreed not to put it into practice immediately. Thus, for example, 
Argentina maintained specific tariff on a great quantities of textiles products as well as on footwear. A similar policy was 
followed in Uruguay for almost 100 textile items.   9
We have also data that allow for a suitable characterization of countries and sectors. Table A1 
in Appendix A presents a detailed description of the dataset indicating aggregation, time coverage, 
and sources. Some specific aspects of the dataset are also discussed in Appendix A2. 
 
4.2  Manufacturing Trade Patterns 
 
According to Venables (2003), preferential trade liberalization may have a significant impact on 
patterns of regional trade. This is exactly what seems to have happened in our case. In particular, the 
trade policy changes seem to have caused a geographical reorientation of trade flows, both at 
aggregate and sectoral levels. One simple aggregate indicator is the share of exports to MERCOSUR in 











ROTX   (1) 
 where  RB
ikt x denotes exports of country i in manufacturing industry k to MERCOSUR at time t 
and 
ikt x is total exports from country i in manufacturing sector k. 
Figure 1 plots this indicator for Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay as a two-years moving 
average over our sample period. This index is highest for Uruguay and lowest for Brazil. Moreover, 
there is a clear upward trend in the relative importance of MERCOSUR as a destination of national 
exports for the three countries since 1991. We should remark that, even though increasing, the relative 
level of intra-bloc exports of the larger partners is substantially lower than that observed among 
European countries (see, e.g., Bevilaqua et al., 1999).  
Sectoral export patterns can be described using the index of regional orientation of trade 
proposed by Yeats (1998). This index takes the ratio of each sector share in a country’s total exports to 




















ROW x represents exports to the rest of the world. This index ranges between 0 and 
infinity. A value of 1 indicates the same tendency to exports the good under consideration to members   10
of the trade agreement and non-members, whereas increasing values suggest a stronger tendency to 
export to regional markets. We normalize this index by the cross-sectional mean in order to highlight 
the relative cross-sectoral geographical specialization, i.e., once the average degree has been controlled 
for. 
  Table 3 identifies for each country the five sectors with the largest increase in the ROSX index 
between 1985-1990 and 1995-1998, i.e., between the period before the establishment of MERCOSUR 
and the customs union period. It also includes their ranks in these two sub-periods. Uruguay has the 
largest sectoral index. Second, we overall observe significant growth rates of the index and also 
important changes in the sectoral rank across sub-periods. Hence, there is evidence of increased 
regional specialization of exports and also of marked intra-distribution mobility. Third, transport 
equipment and textiles are among the sectors with larger rises in the regional orientation of exports 
for the larger countries. As previously mentioned, the former sector has been subject to a special trade 
regime. Tobacco outstands in Argentina and Uruguay.5  
 
4.3   Manufacturing Production Patterns 
 
Manufacturing production patterns in MERCOSUR are described by the distribution of country shares 
in total production value for each industry in this bloc. 
Formally, the production value of industry k in country i at time t is denoted by zikt. This value 




















s   (4) 
Figure 2 plots the evolution of this aggregate indicator over the period 1985-1998 as a two-
years moving average. Brazil is the largest country within the bloc. It has accounted for roughly 70% 
                                                 
5 In Brazil tobacco occupies the seventh position among the sectors with larger increases in their regional orientation indices.   11
of overall manufacturing activity in the MERCOSUR area over the period from 1985 to 1998. The share 
of this country has slightly declined after 1991. Uruguay seems to have witnessed a more pronounced 
decrease in its share over the same years. The opposite is true for Argentina. 
  Of course, there are noticeable cross-sectional differences. Which are the specific sectors in 
which the particular countries have gained or lost shares over time? Figure 3 shows for each country 
the share in MERCOSUR’s total manufacturing production value and their changes over the sub-
periods 1985-1990 and 1995-1998. This figure allows us to assess the production structures before and 
after the entry into force of MERCOSUR.  
We observe substantial changes over time. Argentina registered increased shares in almost all 
sectors, but there is a significant variation over industries. This country’s share raised in leather 
products, while Brazil and Uruguay experienced decreases. The higher share of Argentina in pottery, 
china, and earthenware comes essentially at the expense of the smaller country, Uruguay, while the 
higher share in other non-metallic minerals at the expense of Brazil. On the contrary, Brazil and 
Uruguay expanded slightly their shares in professional and scientific instruments. 
  Simple correlations between the share of each country in each industry and the score in 
selected industry characteristics show that the two countries with higher specialization in agriculture 
activities, Argentina and especially Uruguay, have higher shares in industries which use intensively 
agriculture inputs. Trends are, however, different. The tendency is increasing in the case of Uruguay 
and decreasing in the case of Argentina. Similarly, Brazil, the country with the largest industrial base 
in the region, has a higher relative importance in sectors which use intensively manufactured inputs 
and sell a large fraction of their output to manufacturing firms (see Sanguinetti et al., 2004). The above 
correlations are suggestive but, because of their bivariate nature, they cannot be considered a rigorous 
examination of the determinants of industry location. Therefore, we turn to a formal econometric 
analysis in the next section. 
 
5 Empirical  Methodology 
 
The question we investigate is the following: Did the establishment of MERCOSUR have an impact on 
the configuration of the manufacturing sector across member countries? In order to answer this   12
question, we perform a formal econometric analysis. This section introduces the empirical 
methodology. First, we describe the general econometric strategy and the hypotheses. Third, we 
define the selected model specification and review relevant estimation issues.  
 
5.1   General Approach and Hypotheses: Capturing Preferential Trade Liberalization 
 
Manufacturing production patterns are described by the distribution of country shares in the total 
MERCOSUR production value for each industry, as defined in Equation (3). 
Several empirical studies of production patterns estimate summary statistics (e.g., 
concentration and specialization indices) on these shares and then regress such measures on industry 
or country characteristics.6 This strategy has, however, two main disadvantages (see, e.g., Combes and 
Overman, 2003). First, theory does not always provide a clear guidance with respect to the expected 
relationship between these summary measures and economic unit characteristics. Second, using 
summary statistics implies wasting information on the distribution of manufacturing industries across 
space, since individual industry shares are available. Therefore, we take these shares as our raw 
dependent variable. 
In order to explain these shares we adopt as a starting point the approach that has been 
proposed by Midelfart et al. (2000) and Overman et al. (2000), which allows us to come closer to the 
theory than those based on summary statistics. The general idea is that industries that use intensively 
a given “factor” tend to locate in countries that are relatively abundant in this “factor”. Thus, if 
countries differ in their endowments of educated population, then industries which use intensively 
well educated workers will be drawn to countries with relatively high shares of these workers. This 
suggests explaining production patterns through a set of interactions resulting from a specific pairing 
of industry characteristics and country characteristics. The particular correspondence of country and 
industry characteristics mirrors a set of hypotheses identified from traditional and new international 
trade theories. These theories are the frameworks in which Venables (2003) and Puga and Venables 
(1998) respectively derive their predictions of the impact of preferential trade liberalization on 
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manufacturing production patterns across member countries, while these country and industry 
characteristics are the mechanism through which this impact takes place.  
Interactions are listed in Table 4. The respective hypotheses will be considered next. Appendix 
A3 contains details about the construction of the underlying variables.  
According to the traditional trade theory, production patterns are determined exogenously by 
the spatial distribution of natural resources and production factors. Activities settle in locations 
abundant in the factors those activities use most intensively. This general proposition can be 
translated into the following three specific hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Industries that use intensively agriculture inputs tend to locate in countries with a large 
endowment of arable land. 
Hypothesis 2: Labor intensive industries tend to be drawn to countries which are relatively labor 
abundant. 
Hypothesis 3: Industries that use intensively skilled workforce tend to be drawn to countries which are 
relatively well endowed with skilled labor. 
New trade theories predict sectors with increasing returns tend to settle in locations with good 
access to the markets of their respective products (see, e.g., Krugman, 1980, and Krugman and 
Helpman, 1985). This result derives from the interaction between scale economies and trade costs. In 
the presence of economies of scale, producers operate more efficiently by spatially concentrating their 
activities. The existence of trade costs in turn induces firms to concentrate in the country which has the 
larger effective market for their goods, since in this way they are able to avoid such costs in a larger 
fraction of their sales. The following hypothesis can be thus established: 
Hypothesis 4: Industries with increasing returns to scale tend to locate in countries with large market 
potentials.  
In particular, when imperfect competitive industries are linked through an input-output 
structure and trade costs are positive, the firms in the upstream industry are drawn to locations where 
there are relatively many firms of the downstream industry, because in this way they can reach their 
customers more easily (demand linkage). Moreover, the fact of having a larger number of upstream 
firms in a location benefits downstream firms, which obtain their intermediate goods at lower costs, 
by saving transport costs and also benefiting from a larger variety of differentiated inputs (cost   14
linkage). Hence, the joint action of such linkages might result in an agglomeration of vertically linked 
industries and could give such an equilibrium location a certain inherent stability (see Venables, 1996). 
In this sense, the above reasoning provides a rationale for the notion of industrial base. Therefore, 
industries which use intensively manufactured intermediate inputs and industries for which demand comes to a 
large extent from the manufacturing sector itself tend to locate in regions with large industrial bases. This is 
stated in the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 5: Industries which rely highly on industrial intermediate inputs tend to locate in countries 
with a large industrial base and thus ensuring a better access to their relevant providers.  
Hypothesis 6: Industries for which the manufacturing sector itself is an important user of their products 
find advantageous to locate in countries with a large industrial base and hence providing a better access to a 
significant demand source. 
We have thus identify the main determinants of production patterns according to the theory. 
Using a new trade model embedded in a traditional trade one, Amiti (2001) shows that the balance 
between comparative advantage and cost and demand linkages depends on the level of trade costs 
with the latter being relatively more important for intermediate trade barriers. Hence, one could 
evaluate the effect of trade liberalization by looking at the relative strength of these forces. Previous 
empirical studies generally assume a perfect correlation between time and deepness of integration. 
Thus, in order to assess the impact of reducing trade costs on production patterns, these studies rely 
on an “implicit strategy”, i.e., they report estimation results for different sub-periods and implicitly or 
explicitly argue that observed changes in the relative importance of the different determinants, e.g., 
estimated coefficients on the interaction terms, are driven by economic integration.  
Is this a reasonable methodological approach for our case study? We believe that this 
approach is inadequate for our purposes. First, member countries of MERCOSUR implemented rather 
simultaneously several structural reforms including privatizations and de-regulations, which went 
well beyond the trade dimension. We need therefore to explicitly disentangle the effect of trade policy. 
Second, as mentioned in Section 4, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay reduced their trade barriers 
unilaterally to the rest of the world and concertedly to their partners within the agreement. In 
particular, these economies are relatively small and trade with the rest of the world is significant. In 
addition, while intra-bloc trade was to a large extent tariff-free by 1996, MFN tariffs on manufacturing   15
goods are relatively high when compared with those of developed countries. Hence, the preferential 
nature of trade liberalization should be explicitly taken into account. In fact, as shown before, 
establishment of this trade agreement seems to have had a significant impact on aggregate and 
sectoral trade flows. Various empirical analyses confirm this conclusion. In particular, Yeats (1998) 
shows a pronounced increase in the regional orientation of exports for those goods subject to higher 
tariff preferences.  
Therefore, in the case of MERCOSUR countries, the original approach must be extended. 
Specifically, we improve upon the basic setting suggested by Midelfart et al. (2000) and Overman et al. 
(2000) by including a measure of sectoral preferential margin. This is our first methodological 
contribution.  
The preferential margin is derived as follows. Starting from Brazilian sectoral tariff data, we 
have constructed a proxy for the preference tariff variable, which measures the degree of intra-bloc 
trade impediments in each sector. Then we have combined this sectoral preferential tariff with the 
respective MFN tariff into an indicator of preferential margin (see Appendix A3 for more details). We 
have thus a variable which measures the level of trade barriers within the bloc relative to those with 
the rest of the world. This variable is an appropriate empirical counterpart to the theoretical one to 
assess the effect of preferential trade agreements among developing countries who still have relatively 
high extra-zone trade barriers. Indeed, the no inclusion of this indicator may lead to biased estimates 
due to the omission of potentially relevant information.  
The preference margin variable allow us to explicitly test the following hypotheses that can be 
derived from the theoretical studies reviewed in Section 2: 
Hypothesis 7: Higher preferential margins strengthen the responsiveness of manufacturing production 
patterns to regional comparative advantage patterns, i.e., to the matching of country and industry 
characteristics within the region, for those sectors where member countries have a comparative disadvantage 
with respect to the rest of the world.  
Hypothesis 8: Higher preferential margins increase (decrease) the responsiveness of production patterns 
to the distribution of market potentials over member countries of the arrangement for those sectors featuring 
economies of scale and significant cost and demand linkages for intermediate (low) internal trade barriers  
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5.2  Model Specification and Estimation Issues: The need for GMM 
 
The dependent variable is the share of a country in total manufacturing production value in each 
industry, sik. Note that this ratio can only take values within [0,1] so that the dependent variable is 
truncated. As a consequence, classical estimation will lead to biased estimates. Therefore, we perform 
a logistic transformation, similar to Balassa and Noland (1989). The variable becomes ln[sik/(1-sik)] and 
ranges in ) , ( +∞ −∞ . 
The dependent variable is expressed as a function of the interactions between industry 
characteristics and country characteristics, and country-, industry-, and time-fixed effects, which 




) ( j i ϖ is the level of the jth characteristic in country i and  ) ( j k θ is the industry k value of the 
industry characteristic paired with the country characteristic,  i ς ,  k ν , and  t τ are country-, industry, 
and time-fixed effects, respectively.7 
As discussed in the previous sub-section, we extend this model incorporating a variable that 







where pm denotes sectoral preferential margin.  
With Equation (3) we aim at assessing the overall impact of tariff preferences, i.e., across 
sectors, while with Equation (4) we explore the mechanism behind the observed aggregate patterns. In 
particular, we interact the sectoral preferential m a r g i n  w i t h  e a c h  m a t c h i n g  p a i r  o f  c o u n t r y  a n d  
                                                 
7 This paper aims at analyzing the influence of preferential trade liberalization on production patterns across MERCOSUR 
member countries. Our econometric strategy does not allow us to discriminate between pure internal relocation and the new 
settlements. In order to perform such an examination we would need data on sectoral foreign direct investment. This is, 
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industry characteristics. The coefficients on the original interactions will thus measure the 
responsiveness of production patterns to these characteristics matching when there is no tariff 
preference and the new interactions will capture to what extent preferences accentuate or ameliorate 
such responsiveness.  
Our sample includes 27 industries, 3 countries, and 14 years, 1985-1998, i.e., it contains 1,134 
observations.8 Moreover, we condition on the standard deviation of the underlying variables in order 
to make comparison across variables more appropriate so that the coefficients that will be presented 
are standardized ones. Furthermore, there are three potential sources of heteroscedasticity: across 
countries, across industries, and across time.9 Hence, White (1980)’s heteroscedastic consistent 
standard errors are reported and used for hypothesis testing.  
Two main problems, which may result in biased and inconsistent estimations, are usually 
under-addressed in the literature. First, most empirical studies use a static framework, i.e., they carry 
out cross-sectional regressions (see, e.g., Midelfart et al., 2000 and Overman et al., 2000) or a static 
panel data analysis (see, e.g., Kim, 1995, Amity, 1999). However, production patterns are likely to 
display inertia (see, e.g., Baldwin et al., 2003 and Robert-Nicoud, 2004). In fact, the Baltagi-Lee test for 
autocorrelation in our fixed-effect model suggest that there is serial correlation of first order in the 
disturbances.10 A dynamic panel estimation is then required. It is well known that LSDV (Least Square 
Dummy Variables) estimates are biased and inconsistent when lagged dependent variables are 
included in the regression equation (see, e.g., Nickell, 1981, and Kiviet, 1995).  
On the other hand, endogeneity is potentially a severe problem for the kind of estimations we 
are proposing. Thus, skill intensive industries tend to locate in skill abundant countries, but causation 
can run also in the opposite direction: by settling in a country, industries employing highly qualified 
workers may end up changing its relative skill abundance through induced migration. A similar 
reasoning also applies to firms with input-output linkages, as suggested by the new trade theories. We 
                                                 
8 The industry “Other manufacturing industries“, which is a residual component, was dropped out.  
9 The White’s general test perform to test for heteroskedasticity (see Greene, 1997). This test suggests that indeed there is 
heteroscedasticity. The corresponding chi-square statistic is highly significant. 
10 These test statistics are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request.    18
therefore treat all right-hand size variables as endogenous. The panel structure of our data allows us 
to generate appropriate instruments and thus to improve on previous works.  
Specifically, to address both econometric problems, we estimate previous equations by GMM 
estimations using the method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) after incorporating one lag of 
the dependent variable on the right hand side. This method first-differentiate previous equations and 
permits to obtain additional instruments using the orthogonality conditions existent between lagged 
values of the dependent variable and the disturbances (for additional details see Arellano and Bond, 
1991, and Baltagi, 1995). This is our second methodological contribution.  
 
6 Estimation  Results 
 
We proceed in two steps, which are related to the contributions we aim at. First, since we are looking 
at developing countries, we want to compare our results with those based on developed countries. We 
therefore generate estimation results following the general approach proposed by Midelfart et al. 
(2000) and Overman et al. (2000), but using the improved econometric techniques we described before. 
More precisely, we first report GMM estimates of Equation (5) for the whole period, 1985-1998, and 
for “moving” equally-sized sub-samples of this period beginning with 1985-1993 and finishing with 
1990-1998.11 Second, we turn to the explicit assessment of preferential trade liberalization, i.e., to the 
estimation of Equations (6) and (7). 
Table 5 reports results from GMM estimates for the whole sample period and “moving” sub-
periods, where the standard errors have been corrected to account for unknown heteroscedasticity. 
This table includes also two specification tests: the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions and the 
test for second order autocorrelation.12 The Sargan test statistics indicate that the instruments are 
                                                 
11 We have chosen sub-periods of 9 years to ensure a reasonable minimum number of time periods to carry out GMM 
estimations. 
12 The test statistics for first order autocorrelation (not reported) is significant in all specification. The null hypothesis of absence 
of serial correlation of this order can be thus rejected.    19
valid. Moreover, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of absence of serial correlation of second order. 13 
Accordingly, our estimations are consistent. 
The first column shows a pattern of matching between specific country characteristics and 
specific industry characteristics, which confirms the priors derived from theory, especially those from 
the traditional trade theory. Thus, industries that use intensively agricultural inputs tend to be located 
in countries that are relatively abundant in arable land. Similarly, industries that use intensively 
skilled labor tend to be located in countries that are relatively abundant in this factor. Furthermore, 
industries with increasing returns to scale tend to locate in countries with larger market potentials. In 
addition, sectors which use intensively industrial intermediate inputs tend to locate in countries with 
larger industrial market potentials. We do not find, however, a clear link between labor abundance 
and labor intensity and industrial market potential and relative importance of intermediate demand in 
total demand.14 To summarize, the data provide support for Hypotheses 1, 3, 4, and 5. 
We have checked the robustness of these estimation results in several ways. First, we used the 
absolute production value instead of the shares as dependent variable.15 Second, we tested the 
stability of parameters by sequentially introducing the explanatory variables. Third, the differentiation 
performed when applying the method of Arellano and Bond (1991) implies removing country-fixed 
effects. We have therefore included population or GDP in GMM estimations to control for size. 
Fourth, we have also utilized alternative measures of labor abundance, labor intensity, and market 
potential (see Appendix A3 for more details). In all cases, results were qualitatively the same.16 
                                                 
13 There is evidence of second order autocorrelation for the regression that corresponds to the sub-period 1989-1997. 
Nevertheless, the time trend over the set of regressions for the coefficients of interest seems to be clear. In addition, we 
incorporated a second lag value for the dependent variable in the regression with the consequence of removing such serial 
correlation. Also in this case the main picture remains robust. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
14 Amiti (2001) shows that industries may end up located in countries without a matching comparative advantage when there 
are other competitive reasons for location: the convenience to be settled closer to providers of other intermediate inputs or to 
customers. 
15 We have also performed estimations using the share of national sectoral manufacturing production value to total GDP as 
dependent variable. In this case, the same comparative advantage factors remain positive and significant.  
16 These results are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request.    20
As discussed before, the effect of trade integration on manufacturing production patterns is 
usually assessed running separate regressions for different sub-periods and comparing the estimated 
coefficients measuring the responsiveness of these patterns to the matching of specific country and 
industry characteristics. Detected changes are then implicitly or explicitly attributed to the process of 
integration. Our “moving regressions” replicate this procedure.  
We find that interactions involving factor endowments and factor intensities, specifically 
abundance and intensity of agriculture and skilled labor, show an upward trend. Production patterns 
across MERCOSUR member countries seems thus becoming more sensitive to comparative advantage 
considerations. This is exactly what we would expect in an environment where trade is being 
liberalized. On the other hand, interactions involving market potential and economies of scale and 
industrial market potential and intensity in intermediate manufactured inputs do not display a 
monotonic trend. Estimations suggest that the responsiveness to these factors has followed an 
inverted-U shaped path: it has first increased and then decreased.17 These results can reflect the fact 
that, as suggested by the theory, agglomeration forces are stronger at intermediate levels of trade 
costs. Finally, demand linkages, as measured by the interaction between industrial market potential 
and intensity of sales to industry, even though still insignificant, show a growing relative importance.  
  Are these results comparable to those from previous studies focusing on developed countries? 
Midelfart et al. (2000) and Overman et al. (2000) perform a similar analysis for Europe and are thus a 
natural benchmark. They run cross-section regressions for specific years over the period 1980-1997 
and compare the coefficients on the interactions over time. These authors find that the location of 
industries intensive in R&D and skilled labor have become increasingly responsive to countries’ 
endowments of researchers and well educated labor force in general, respectively. Similarly, 
industries using intensively agriculture inputs have become overrepresented in countries with 
abundant agriculture production. Our results are in line with these findings. 
  Moreover, according to Midelfart et al. (2000), the tendency of industries with economies of 
scale to locate in central countries has decreased over time, while the opposite is true for industries 
                                                 
17 In the case of the interaction between industrial market potential and industrial inputs intensity a slight increase in the last 
sub-period can be observed. However, the average value over the last sub-periods is significantly lower than that over the first 
sub-periods.    21
with strong cost and demand linkages. Overman et al. (2000) use specific and hence different 
measures of market access (i.e., supplier and demand access). In this case, their econometric results 
suggest that supplier access is not significant for the location of manufacturing industries and that 
demand linkages are significant but their effect is declining over time. Comparing these results with 
our findings we get a mixed picture. We have also found a declining significance of market potential 
for industries with economies of scale towards the end of the period. Furthermore, similar to Midelfart 
et al. (2000), we detect an increasing importance of demand linkages (although they are not 
significant). Finally, contrary to these authors, we overall observe a weakening of cost linkages.  
The previous econometric analysis has followed the existent literature in assessing the impact 
of trade liberalization through an implicit approach. Indeed, observed changes in the relative 
importance of explanatory factors could be the net results of the multiple reforms that were 
implemented in the region since the second half of the 1980s. In particular, they could be driven by 
preferential trade liberalization, but also by the general unilateral opening of the economies. The 
relevant question is then: Is there any specific role for MERCOSUR? To answer this question we turn 
to the estimation of Equations (6) and (7). 
Table 6 reports GMM estimates of Equation (6). They suggest that the smallest country in the 
bloc, Uruguay, has systematically lower shares in those sectors with higher preferential margins.18 We 
have also replicated the analysis for the sub-period 1990-1998. Results are presented in Table 7. The 
coefficient on the interaction between Uruguay’s dummy and preferential margin is larger (in absolute 
value) than for the whole sample period, 1985-1998. This suggests an intensification of the effect over 
the first years after the launching of the trade arrangement. Moreover, estimated coefficients on other 
variables decline as the preferential margin is included, which indicates that they could be capturing 
the influence of preferential trade liberalization. Therefore, as predicted by the theory, regional trade 
agreements among asymmetric developing countries bias manufacturing production patterns against 
the country which have an extreme comparative advantage in other sectors and are small. In 
particular, Uruguay has comparative advantage in agriculture products and has a narrower 
preexistent industrial base in comparison to Argentina and Brazil (see INTRACEN, 2004). Under such 
                                                 
18 Uruguay is the smallest country in the sample as measured by population and GDP and, in spite of its central position, the 
one with the smallest market potentials (when internal distances are set to be lower than international distances).    22
circumstances, the expected result from a preferential trade arrangement between these countries is a 
decline in the manufacturing share of the former country.  
Previous econometric results show that preferential trade liberalization has had an impact on 
aggregate production patterns across Southern Cone countries. This is compatible with two 
explanations. The question then arises: What are the main mechanisms? Comparative advantage or 
market size? 
Estimates of Equation (7) provide us an answer to this question. Results are reported in Table 
8. These results suggest that higher preferences margins tend to be associated with a higher sensitivity 
of production patterns to comparative advantage considerations along two dimensions: labor and 
skilled labor.19 Hence, (skilled) labor intensive industries show a stronger tendency to locate in 
countries with larger endowments of (skilled) labor in the presence of larger preference margins. 
Interestingly, we do not find any significant impact of these preferences on the responsiveness of 
production patterns of industries using intensively agriculture inputs to countries’ endowments of 
arable land. Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have a revealed comparative advantage in these sectors, 
as measured by the Balassa-index, especially in food products (see Volpe Martincus, 2003). The 
increased coefficient on this interaction observed in our “moving regressions” could be thus traced 
back to general trade liberalization. On the other hand, higher preferential margins weaken the 
tendency of sectors with increasing returns to scale to locate in countries with larger market potentials. 
Finally, we do not observe a clear effect on sensitivity to market access. These last results would 
correspond to a scenario where the trading agreement is associated with low internal barriers. In order 
to test the plausibility of this interpretation, we re-estimate Equation (7), this time with internal 
(preferential) tariffs as trade policy instrument instead of preferential margins. Results are presented 
in Table 9. They confirm our priors. Lower intra-bloc tariffs weaken the tendency of sectors with 
increasing returns and strong cost linkages to locate in countries with larger market potentials.20 
                                                 
19 We have performed regressions with both contemporaneous interactions as well as interactions with lagged preferential 
margins because we do not have exact priors about the timing of the impacts. In particular, we could expect these effects to 
follow trade liberalization with a lag.  
20 We use the level of internal tariff as interacting term, so the positive sign on the interactions suggests that higher internal 
tariffs are associated with higher sensitivity to market potential.    23
Therefore, the evidence provides support for Hypothesis 7. Preferential trade liberalization 
seems to be favoring a restructuring of production patterns across MERCOSUR member countries 
along the lines of internal comparative advantage, as we should expect according to Venables (2003). 
Furthermore, it seems to weaken agglomeration forces, which is in line with the theoretical prediction 
by Puga and Venables (1998) when intra-bloc trade obstacles are low enough. 
 
7 Concluding  Remarks 
 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay have actively engaged in trade liberalization initiatives 
during the last 20 years. These initiatives have resulted in significant changes in the spatial 
distribution of economic activities. This paper has uncovered the determinants of these changing 
manufacturing production patterns over the period 1985-1998 in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. We 
contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence on developing countries, by assessing 
explicitly the impact of preferential trade liberalization, and by using appropriate techniques to 
address econometric problems such as serial correlation and endogeneity.  
In order to distinguish the role of increased economic integration on changing manufacturing 
production patterns, we first followed the existent literature in re-estimating the regression equation 
that specifies the determinants of these patterns for “moving sub-periods” from 1985-1993 to 1990-
1998 which accompany the evolution of MERCOSUR. According to this evidence, increased 
integration appears associated with a higher sensitivity of production patterns to comparative 
advantage, namely, to countries’ endowments of arable land and skilled labor. Furthermore, the 
responsiveness of industries with increased returns to scale and strong cost linkages to market 
potentials seems to have followed an inverted U-shaped path as trade costs declined.  
We complemented this indirect evidence by explicitly assessing the role of preferential trade 
liberalization including a measure of sectoral preferential margin interacted with country dummies as 
an additional explanatory variables in the original model. We found, in concordance with the theory, 
that Uruguay, the smallest country in the sample and with an extreme comparative advantage in 
agriculture (relative to Argentina and Brazil), has systematically lower shares in sectors with higher 
preferential margins.    24
Moreover, we attempted to undercover the mechanisms behind this aggregate result. In 
particular, we interacted the preferential margin with each matching pair of country and industry 
characteristics. Our econometric results are in line with theoretical predictions suggesting that 
preferential trade liberalization in the Southern Cone is driving a spatial reorganization of production 
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Country/year 1985 1991 1994
Argentina MFN 39.20 14.22 15.40
Brazil 36.60 7.20 5.10
Uruguay 36.00 8.10 10.70
Brazil MFN 55.09 20.37 9.70
Argentina 51.90 10.00 3.20
Uruguay 51.10 10.70 4.90
Uruguay MFN 35.87 21.35 13.63
Argentina 34.60 15.50 12.00
Brazil 34.60 15.80 10.00
Source: Estevadeordal et al (2000)
MERCOSUR: Preferential Tariffs by Countries (1985-1994)
MFN and Preferential Tariffs
Argentina 11.78 0.36 13.37 0.86
Brazil 13.14 0.02 15.44 0.02
Uruguay 10.78 0.88 11.01 1.77
Mercosur CET 11.75 0.00 11.09 0.00
Source: Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998).













Figure 1: Manufacturing Exports to MERCOSUR as a Percentage of Total Manufacturing Exports 
















































































Index Rank Index Rank
Miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal 0.29 23 5.94 1 5.65
Transport equipment 1.93 4 4.22 2 2.30
Tobacco 0.19 24 2.46 3 2.27
Footwear 1.04 14 2.39 4 1.35
Textiles 0.35 22 0.69 12 0.34
Beverages 3.49 2 5.73 1 2.24
Transport equipment 0.46 21 1.40 6 0.93
Wearing apparel 1.56 23 2.34 12 0.78
Plastics products 0.41 6 1.09 2 0.69
Textiles 0.66 18 1.17 13 0.51
Iron and steel 2.61 2 10.08 1 7.48
Glass products 1.17 4 4.53 2 3.36
Tobacco 0.02 22 1.93 4 1.91
Furniture and fixtures 0.71 15 1.99 6 1.29
Petroleum refineries 0.08 14 1.31 9 1.23
The Table reports the (normalized) index of regional orientation of exports at the sectoral level calculated as indicated in Equation (2).
This index has been averaged over the sub-periods 1985-1990 and 1995-1998. "Change" corresponds to the absolute variation











Figure 2: National Manufacturing Production Value as a Percentage of MERCOSUR Total 
Manufacturing Production Value 









The Figure plots aggregate production shares by country as defined in Equation (4) in 
text multiplied by 100. 
 
 
Figure 3: Countries’ Shares in MERCOSUR Manufacturing Production Value and Changes  













The Figure plots sectoral production shares by country as defined in Equation (3) in text multiplied by 
100. These shares are averaged over the sub-periods 1985-1990 and 1995-1998. “Variation” corresponds 
to the absolute change between these sub-periods. Industries are numbered following the order in 
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Agriculture abundance * Agriculture intensity
Labor abundance * Labor intensity
Skilled labor abundance * Skilled labor intensity
Market potential * Economies of scale
Industrial market potential * Industrial intermediate consumption
Industrial market potential * Sales to industry
Preferential trade 
liberalization -        
Aggregate Impact (2)
Country dummies * Preferential margin
Agriculture abundance * Agriculture intensity * Preferential margin
Labor abundance * Labor intensity * Preferential margin
Skilled labor abundance * Skilled labor intensity * Preferential margin
Market potential * Economies of scale * Preferential margin
Industrial market potential * Industrial intermediate consumption * Preferential margin
Industrial market potential * Sales to industry * Preferential margin
Note: 
(1): Variables included in the estimation of Equation (5)
(1) + (2): Variables included in the estimation of Equation (6)
(1) + (3): Variables included in the estimation of Equation (7)

























1985-1998 1985-1993 1986-1994 1987-1995 1988-1996 1989-1997 1990-1998
lnts lnts lnts lnts lnts lnts lnts
Agriculture abundance * Agriculture intensity 0.252 -0.100 0.272 0.311 0.233 0.292 0.307
(0.049)*** (0.189) (0.107)** (0.103)*** (0.088)*** (0.080)*** (0.084)***
Labor abundance * Labor intensity -0.070 -0.091 -0.103 -0.091 -0.054 -0.043 -0.049
(0.030)** (0.041)** (0.041)** (0.041)** (0.044) (0.045) (0.041)
Skilled labor abundance * Skilled labor intensity 0.045 0.004 0.039 0.027 0.044 0.070 0.083
(0.026)* (0.049) (0.048) (0.045) (0.041) (0.033)** (0.035)**
Market potential * Economies of scale 0.086 0.039 0.067 0.061 0.074 0.059 0.056
(0.033)** (0.036) (0.031)** (0.029)** (0.042)* (0.042) (0.038)
Industrial market potential * Intermediate inputs intensity 0.192 0.277 0.284 0.264 0.192 0.157 0.194
(0.056)*** (0.079)*** (0.080)*** (0.077)*** (0.086)** (0.091)* (0.080)**
Industrial market potential * Intensity of sales to industry -0.006 -0.056 -0.076 -0.014 0.027 0.078 0.091
(0.069) (0.113) (0.096) (0.109) (0.118) (0.112) (0.111)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
972 567 567 567 567 567 567
62.96 69.10 69.32 70.53 67.88 72.22 67.83
-0.38 0.36 -0.53 0.31 -0.34 -2.00** -1.44
The table reports GMM estimations based on the procedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
Results correspond to one-step estimations
Dependent variable is the (logistically transformed) location share as defined in Equation (3) in text
One lag of the dependent variable included (not reported)
All right-hand side variables in Equation (5) are treated as endogenous
The Sargan test statistics is based on the two-step estimations
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The Impact of Trade Liberalization - Moving Regressions
Explanatory variables - Interactions
Year fixed-effects
Number of observations
Sargan test for overidentification, X
2 (189)

































Agriculture abundance * Agriculture intensity 0.202 0.151
(0.058)*** (0.060)**
Labor abundance * Labor intensity -0.070 -0.060
(0.030)** (0.031)*
Skilled labor abundance * Skilled labor intensity 0.028 0.012
(0.024) (0.025)
Market potential * Economies of scale 0.093 0.082
(0.031)*** (0.031)***
Industrial market potential * Intermediate inputs intensity 0.201 0.163
(0.053)*** (0.057)***
Industrial market potential * Intensity of sales to industry -0.009 -0.012
(0.069) (0.078)
Argentina and Brazil * Preferential margin 0.001
(0.022)
Uruguay * Preferential margin -0.065 -0.073
(0.028)** (0.028)***
Argentina * Preferential margin 0.031
(0.025)






The table reports GMM estimations based on the procedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
Results correspond to one-step estimations
Dependent variable is the (logistically transformed) location share as defined in Equation (3) in text
One lag of the dependent variable included (not reported)
All interactions between country and industry characteristics in Equation (6) are treated as endogenous
The Sargan test statistics is based on the two-step estimations
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Sargan test for overidentification, X
2
Test for second order autocorrelation, z 
The Impact of Preferential Trade Liberalization on Aggregate Production Patterns (1985-1998)
Explanatory variables - Interactions
Year fixed-effects

































Agriculture abundance * Agriculture intensity 0.308 0.253 0.211
(0.086)*** (0.092)*** (0.093)**
Labor abundance * Labor intensity -0.062 -0.070 -0.063
(0.042) (0.038)* (0.039)
Skilled labor abundance * Skilled labor intensity 0.073 0.037 0.014
(0.036)** (0.035) (0.038)
Market potential * Economies of scale 0.065 0.054 0.049
(0.038)* (0.031)* (0.032)
Industrial market potential * Intermediate inputs intensity 0.216 0.201 0.196
(0.085)** (0.092)** (0.090)**
Industrial market potential * Intensity of sales to industry 0.082 0.036 0.035
(0.124) (0.122) (0.126)
Argentina and Brazil * Preferential margin -0.042
(0.040)
Uruguay * Preferential margin -0.080 -0.132
(0.040)** (0.049)***
Argentina * Preferential margin -0.020
(0.045)






The table reports GMM estimations based on the procedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
Results correspond to one-step estimations
Dependent variable is the (logistically transformed) location share as defined in Equation (3) in text
One lag of the dependent variable included (not reported)
All interactions between country and industry characteristics in Equation (6) are treated as endogenous
The Sargan test statistics is based on the two-step estimations
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The Impact of Preferential Trade Liberalization on Aggregate Production Patterns (1990-1998)
Test for second order autocorrelation, z 
Explanatory variables - Interactions
Year fixed-effects
Number of observations


































Agriculture abundance * Agriculture intensity 0.221 0.256
(0.079)*** (0.070)***
Labor abundance * Labor intensity -0.105 -0.081
(0.032)*** (0.034)**
Skilled labor abundance * Skilled labor intensity 0.004 -0.001
(0.042) (0.038)
Market potential * Economies of scale 0.064 0.071
(0.032)** (0.033)**
Industrial market potential * Intermediate inputs intensity 0.261 0.237
(0.054)*** (0.057)***
Industrial market potential * Intensity of sales to industry -0.044 -0.028
(0.076) (0.078)
Preferential margin *
Agriculture abundance * Agriculture intensity 0.018 0.006
(0.020) (0.012)
Labor abundance * Labor intensity 0.069 0.013
(0.040)* (0.010)
Skilled labor abundance * Skilled labor intensity 0.041 0.025
(0.029) (0.012)**
Market potential * Economies of scale -0.048 -0.022
(0.024)** (0.014)
Industrial market potential * Intermediate inputs intensity -0.055 -0.013
(0.056) (0.012)






The table reports GMM estimations based on the procedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
Results correspond to one-step estimations
Dependent variable is the (logistically transformed) location share as defined in Equation (3) in text
One lag of the dependent variable included (not reported)
All right-hand side variables in Equation (7) are treated as endogenous (except preferential margin)
(1): Contemporaneous interactions between matching characteristics and preferential margins
(2): Interactions between lagged preferential margins and matching characteristics
The Sargan test statistics is based on the two-step estimations
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Number of observations
Sargan test for overidentification, X
2
Test for second order autocorrelation, z 
The Mechanisms of the Impact of Preferential Trade Liberalization (1985-1998)
Explanatory variables - Interactions

































Agriculture abundance * Agriculture intensity 0.246 0.238
(0.053)*** (0.057)***
Labor abundance * Labor intensity -0.062 -0.068
(0.028)** (0.027)**
Skilled labor abundance * Skilled labor intensity 0.045 0.049
(0.026)* (0.027)*
Market potential * Economies of scale 0.001 -0.003
(0.019) (0.021)
Industrial market potential * Intermediate inputs intensity 0.264 0.237
(0.052)*** (0.054)***
Industrial market potential * Intensity of sales to industry -0.023 0.009
(0.065) (0.065)
Internal tariff *
Agriculture abundance * Agriculture intensity -0.013 -0.004
(0.022) (0.013)
Labor abundance * Labor intensity -0.170 -0.038
(0.064)*** (0.016)**
Skilled labor abundance * Skilled labor intensity -0.013 -0.011
(0.026) (0.020)
Market potential * Economies of scale 0.078 0.029
(0.039)** (0.015)*
Industrial market potential * Intermediate inputs intensity 0.100 0.030
(0.073) (0.016)*






The table reports GMM estimations based on the procedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
Results correspond to one-step estimations of Equation (7) with pm reemplaced by internal tariffs
Dependent variable is the (logistically transformed) location share as defined in Equation (3) in text
One lag of the dependent variable included (not reported)
All right-hand side variables are treated as endogenous (except internal tariff)
(1): Contemporaneous interactions between matching characteristics and preferential margins
(2): Interactions between lagged internal (preferential) tariffs and matching characteristics
The Sargan test statistics is based on the two-step estimations
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Sargan test for overidentification, X
2
Test for second order autocorrelation, z 
The Impact of Internal Trade Liberalization (1985-1998)
Explanatory variables - Interactions
Year fixed-effects
Number of observations  36













Manufacturing sectors according to the ISIC, Revision 2, at the 3 digit level: 311- Food products; 313- Beverages; 314- Tobacco; 321- Textiles; 322- Wearing 
apparel, except footwear; 323- Leather and leather products, except footwear and wearing apparel; 324- Footwear, except vulcanized or moulded rubber or 
plastic footwear; 331-Wood and wood and cork products, except furniture; 332- Furniture and fixtures, except primarily of metal; 341-Paper and paper products; 
342- Printing, publishing and allied industries; 351- Industrial chemicals; 352- Other chemicals product; 353- Petroleum refineries; 354- Miscellaneous products of 
petroleum and coal; 355- Rubber products; 356- Plastic products not elsewhere classified; 361- Pottery, china, and earthenware; 362- Glass and glass products; 
369- Other non-metallic mineral products; 371- Iron and steel; 372- Non-ferrous metals; 381- Fabricated metal products; 382- Machinery, except electrical; 383- 
Electrical machinery apparatus; 384- Transport equipment; 385- Professional, scientific, measuring, controlling, photographic and optic equipment; 390- Other 
manufacturing industries. 
Manufacturing sectors according to the IBGE Sub-sectors Classification: Non metallic minerals; Metallurgy; Mechanics; Electrical and communication 
equipment; Transport equipment; Woods; Furniture; Paper; Printing and publishing; Rubber; Leather and hides; Chemicals; Pharmaceuticals; Perfumes, soaps, 
and candles; Plastics; Textiles; Clothing, footwear, and cloth goods; Food products; Beverages; Tobacco; Other manufacturing industries. 
Variable Aggregation Country coverage Period Source
Production value  ISIC. Rev. 2, 3digits Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 1985-1998 PADI/ECLAC
IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985, 1990-1998 IBGE
Exports and Imports ISIC. Rev. 2, 3digits Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 1985-1998 BADECEL/ECLAC
Employment  IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985-1998 RAIS/Ministry of Works
Value added  IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985, 1990-1998 IBGE
Number of establishments IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985-1998 RAIS/Ministry of Works
Labor compensation IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985-1998 IBGE
Workers qualification IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985-1998 RAIS/Ministry of Works
Intermediate inputs IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985, 1990-1998 IBGE
Sales to industry IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985, 1990-1998 IBGE
Agricultural inputs IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985, 1990-1998 IBGE
Intermediate demand IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985, 1990-1998 IBGE
Total demand  IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1985, 1990-1998 IBGE
Tariffs   IBGE Subsector Classification Brazil 1987-1998 Kume, Piani, Souza (2000)
Total GDP Country Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 1985-1998 PADI/ECLAC
Industrial GDP Country Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 1985-1998 PADI/ECLAC
Skill level of population Country Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 1985, 1990, 1995, 1999 Barro and Lee (2000)
Arable land Country Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 1985-1998 FAO
Data   37
A2  Specific Aspects of the Dataset 
First, the data for several variables, such as the number of establishments, qualifications of workers,  
intensity of use of intermediate inputs, were available only for Brazil. Similar statistical information 
for Argentina and Uruguay was not found. In the case of Argentina, there are data only for a few 
particular years.22 A simple inspection of such available data suggests that using the Brazilian data 
should not be, however,  significantly misleading.23  
Data on intensity in consumption of manufactured intermediate inputs, sales to industry as a 
share of total demand, labor compensation, and agricultural inputs are derived from the Brazilian 
input-output tables published by the IBGE.  These data are available for 1985 and 1990-1998. Data for 
the period 1986-1989 are linearly interpolated or simply assumed to be the same as in 1985 with no 
major impact on results. The reason is that industry characteristics did not have changed significantly 
over the second half of the 1980s. This is plausible, because most important changes in economic 
environment took place since the beginning of the 1990s when trade liberalization deepened.   
Tariff data for each manufacturing sector are taken from Kume et al. (2000). Our econometric 
analysis focuses on the period 1985-1998. However, our tariff data are available beginning with 1987. 
We assume that sectoral tariffs rates in 1985 and 1986 did not significantly differ from those in 1987.24  
These sectoral data are reported according to the IBGE Sub-sectors classification. In order to 
get comparable figures, we have mapped them into the ISIC Rev. 2 Classification using a concordance 
table supplied by the IBGE. 
  Data on the skill level of population reported by Barro and Lee (2000) is available on a 5 years 
basis. Following Harrigan (1997), we have interpolated the values for intermediate years. 
 
A3 Variables 
Agriculture abundance: Share of arable land to total land area. 
Labor abundance: Share of population older than 25 years with incomplete primary education. We 
have also used as an alternative proxy the raw share of each country’s population in MERCOSUR’s 
total population. 
Skilled labor abundance: Share of population older than 25 years which have attained at least high 
school. 
Market potential and Industrial market potential: The market potential of a country is captured 












where i is the country under examination , j corresponds to remaining countries in the bloc, Yi  is the 
GDP (industrial GDP) of country i, dij measures the distance between the most important cities from 
an economic point of view in countries i and j and dii is the intra-state distance, given by 1/6 of the 
radius of a circle with the same area as the country i.25 The value of the measure is higher, the higher 
the own GDP (industrial GDP), viewed as a proxy for own market size, the lower the own area, and 
the lower the distance to the main markets of other countries. 
Distance between cities have been estimated using the formula of geodesic distances by CEPII. 
Formally, the distance between two points i and j is given by: 
                                                 
22 Information on the number of establishments is only available for the years 1985 and 1994 from the National Economic 
Census. Data on intermediate intensity exist also for 1997 (Input-output table published by the INDEC).  
23 For example, the Spearman-rank correlation coefficient for establishment size between Argentina and Brazil was 0.57 in 1985 
and 0.66 in 1994, in both cases significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, the simple correlation between Argentinean and 
Brazilian external tariffs for the ISIC Classification at 4 digits was 0.68 in 1992 and 0.77 in 1994 (Sanguinetti and Sallustro, 2000). 
24 Kume et al. (2000) state that the Brazilian import policy at the starting year of their study, 1987 was essentially based on a 
tariff structure set in 1957.  
25 We use 1/6 instead of 2/3 as in Head and Mayer (2003) and Redding and Venables (2004) for two related reasons. First, 
population and economic activity shows a high spatial concentration in the two larger countries, i.e., Argentina and Brazil, so 
that using this conventional measure would result in a factual understatement of domestic market potentials. Second, we 
wanted to ensure that internal distance is smaller the international distance (see also Redding and Venables, 2004).    38
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where lat is latitude and long means longitude. 
We have also considered a tariff-adjusted measure of market potential defined as follows: 
() ii
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where ρ  is the average preferential tariff applied by the country on intra-MERCOSUR trade flows. 
Agriculture intensity: Share of agriculture inputs to total sectoral production value. 
Labor intensity: Share of labor compensation to sectoral value added. We have also used as an 
alternative proxy a measure of unskilled labor intensity (i.e., share of employees with incomplete 
primary education to total sectoral employment). 
Skilled labor intensity: Share of employees with at least incomplete high school education to total 
sectoral employment. 
Economies of scale: Following Kim (1995) and Amiti (1998), economies of scale are captured by 
establishment size, i.e., the average number of employees per establishment in the industry in 
question. Measuring scale economies is problematic, since they might be product-specific, plant-
specific or due to multi-plant operations (Amiti, 1998). There are other possible measures, such the 
one developed by Pratten (1988) and extensively used by other authors. Pratten ranked industries “in 
order of the importance of the economies of scales for spreading development costs and for 
production costs”. The classification bases on two criteria: engineering estimates of the minimum 
efficient plant scale relative to the industry’s output, and estimates of the cost gradient below the 
minimum efficient scale. Thus, the ranking is based on observed plant size but also on (unexploited) 
potential for scale economies (Brülhart, 1998). However, estimations are exclusively based on 
information about developed countries. For that reason its use for developing countries could be 
inconvenient. 
Industrial intermediate consumption: Share of manufactured inputs to total sectoral production 
value. 
Sales to industry: Share of intermediate demand (i.e., sales to the manufacturing sector) to total 
demand.   














where  k δ is the MFN tariff in sector k  for trade flows with the rest of the world and
k ρ is the 
preferential tariff in sector k  for trade flows within MERCOSUR. Preferential tariffs are in turn 
calculated applying the internal trade liberalization schedule set in the Asunción Treaty on the 
(Brazilian) MFN sectoral tariffs.   
For sectors included in national exception lists, e.g., textiles-wearing apparel, footwear, paper, 
and iron and steel (for more details see  INTAL, 1996), tariff on intra-zone trade flows are kept equal 
to MFN tariffs over the transition period towards the customs union, i.e., 1991-1994 so that 
preferential margins are equal to zero for these sectors during this sub-period. These tariffs are 
thereafter automatically and linearly reduced according to the prescriptions of the Regime for the 
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The figure plots simple (unweighted) averages of MFN and preferential tariffs and 
of preferential margins. MFN tariffs correspond to Brazil and were taken from 
Kume et al. (2000). Preferential tariffs were calculated applying the schedule of 
tariff reductions set in the Treaty of Asuncion and taken into account major 
sectoral exceptions. Preferential margins were estimated from MFN and 
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